Introduction
Engineering and law have much in common. Both require careful assessment of system boundaries to compare costs with benefits and to identify causal relationships. Both engage similar concepts and similar terms, although some of these are the monoglot equivalent of a false friend. Both are ultimately concerned with the actual use of the products that they create or regulate. And both recognize that the use depends in large part on the human user.
This chapter emphasizes the importance of these four concepts-systems, language, use, and users-to the development and regulation of robots. It argues for thoughtfully coordinating the technical and legal domains without thoughtlessly conflating them. Both developers and regulators must understand their interconnecting roles with respect to an emerging system of robotics that, when properly defined, includes humans as well as machines.
Although the chapter applies broadly to robotics, motor vehicle automation provides the primary example for this system. I write as a legal scholar with a background in engineering, and I recognize that efforts to reconcile the domains might in some ways distort them. To ground the discussion, the chapter frequently references four technical documents:
 SAE J3016: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated
Driving Systems, released by SAE International (formerly the Society of Automotive and Aerospace Engineers). 1 I serve on the committee and subcommittee that drafted this report, which defines SAE's levels of vehicle automation.
 Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles, released by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 2 This document defines NHTSA's levels of vehicle automation, which differ somewhat from SAE's levels.
These system elements typically interact with each other. When a building's thermostat detects that the indoor air temperature has fallen below a certain threshold, for example, it turns on the heater, which then warms the air. Once the temperature reaches the threshold, the thermostat turns off the heater. This system, so modeled, has a feedback loop. The temperature affects the heating, which in turn affects the temperature-even though, at the same time, external heat sources like the sun may also raise this temperature.
In this way, system elements can also interact with things outside the system. Only open systems have inputs or outputs, but systems with trivial flows may nonetheless be modeled as closed. A sealed water bottle, for example, is an open system with respect to energy (which can penetrate the bottle to heat the contents) but effectively a closed system with respect to matter (which mostly stays inside or out).
Defining a system's boundaries is a key conceptual challenge. "System boundaries delineate what we consider important from what we deem unimportant. We model the important part." 8 Excluding some elements could obscure feedback loops: An overactive heater will not meaningfully change the outside air temperature, but it could cause building occupants to open their windows, which could keep the indoor air temperature low enough that the thermostat never turns off the heater. Moreover, if the system is incorrectly treated as closed, important factors may be ignored altogether: In a system encompassing its human actors, subsidies are inputs and externalities are outputs.
9
System boundaries can be real or imaginary, but physical and temporal immediacy often have unwarranted appeal. In tort law, which struggles to divide the proximate from the distant, the foreseeable from the unforeseeable, and the direct from the indirect, this appeal helps explain why courts are still reluctant to permit recovery for emotional injuries that "occur far removed in time and space from the negligent conduct that triggered them." 10 In fourth amendment jurisprudence, the fact of physical intrusion underpinned the Supreme Court's conclusion that physically attaching a GPS tracker to a vehicle constitutes a search, 11 while some justices would have looked to the duration of the monitoring.
12
Rising automation and connectivity will demand increasingly thoughtful systems analysis. For at least three reasons, increasingly complex systems could involve or implicate a multitude of others that, at least on first thought, seem unrelated.
First, developments like machine-to-machine networks, over-the-air updates, and three-dimensional printing may lead to products that are neither discrete nor static, complicating traditional distinctions between products and services, among individual products, and among particular versions. Robots may interact not just in the physical realm but also in the cloud, 13 as they draw from and contribute to an assortment of overlapping databases. If so, demarcating these robots on the basis of their physical form may make little sense. A 2013 story about Tesla's factory, for example, counted 160 total robots.
14 But what does this number signify? Why is it not one-or one thousand?
Second, human enhancement and augmentation will blur the boundary between human and machine. Interaction will become integration, and today's space-and time-based lines will no longer be easy to draw. Particularly in time-critical situations, decisions may be wholly delegated to or effectively dictated by automated systems that necessarily present only a subset of the total information available to them.
Third, sophisticated tracking and analysis of economic, environmental, and social impacts over entire product lifecycles may lead to revelations, real or presumed, approaching that of Lorenz's theoretical butterfly effect. 15 Previously unrecognized causal relationships may emerge, and designers and regulators may need to begin from the assumption that everything is connected or connectable.
Developers and regulators of robots may struggle to define these systems, but they should at least do so explicitly. A system, carefully defined, is a powerful concept for describing scope and relation. But when used without this content, the word itself can mislead as much as it can inform. The system that the regulator regulates may have boundaries wholly incongruous with the system that the developer has 10 Conrail v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 545 (1994). Recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress was first limited to victims who had "contemporaneously sustained a physical impact (no matter how slight) or injury due to the defendant's conduct, id. at 547, or who were at least "placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct," id. at 548 (describing the "zone of danger"). Many states have since adopted a broader "relative bystander" test, which nonetheless considers physical, temporal, and relational proximity. Id. at 548. 11 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 12 Id. at 964 (Alito, J. concurring). 13 In this context, "the cloud" refers collectively to networks like the Internet that enable infrastructure, information, and applications to be shared. 14 
Language
The inconsistent use of several key terms within and across the legal, technical, and popular domains contributes potential and ultimately unnecessary confusion. This section highlights several terms susceptible to this confusion: control, risk, safety, reasonableness, efficiency, and responsibility. The concepts that they represent dominate the remainder of this chapter.
Control
Engineered systems, which can be products or services, 16 are generally designed to achieve particular goals. 17 These two qualifications-the existence of an external designer imposing external goals-are essential to conventional control theory, which contemplates "a goal-oriented action" by a subject upon an object.
18 Successful control requires:
(i) A purpose or objective…
(ii) A set of possible actions that offers an element of choice… [and] (iii) … some means of choosing the correct action (ii) that will result in the desired behaviour (i) being produced.
Phrases like these are susceptible to numerous technical, legal, and popular meanings. Consider, for example, the "control" of an automated vehicle. An engineer might picture a real-time control loop with sensors and actuators, a lawyer might envision a broad grant of authority from human to machine analogous to a principal-agent relationship, and the public might imagine runaway cars and killer robots. These connotations could produce different answers to the legally significant question of whether a human driver who delegates certain elements of the driving task to her motor vehicle nonetheless "controls" that vehicle.
21
Moreover, most automatic control systems can be defined broadly enough that they involve a human and narrowly enough that they do not. 22 Even a fully automated vehicle might still rely on a human to select its destination and to specify certain parameters of operation. 23 Indeed, ISO/IEC 15288 expressly notes that "humans can be viewed as both users external to a system and as system elements (i.e., operators) within a system." 24 Here too, the system definition could drive the legal conclusion.
Rather than attempt to define control (as well as particular control systems), SAE J3016 deliberately eschews most standalone uses of the term. 25 Instead, for each level of vehicle automation, it specifies whether the "human driver" or the "automated driving system" performs the "dynamic driving task."
26 It also defines each of these terms; "dynamic driving task" refers to "all of the real-time functions required to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding the selection of destinations and waypoints … and including without limitation object and event detection, recognition, and classification; object and event response; maneuver planning; steering, turning, lane keeping, and lane changing; acceleration and deceleration; and enhancing conspicuity…."
27
In contrast, NHTSA's Preliminary Statement uses "control" twenty-eight times in the five paragraphs describing its levels of automation. 28 Combined function automation, for example, "involves automation of at least two primary control functions designed to work in unison to relieve the driver of control of those functions. Vehicles at this level of automation can utilize shared authority when the driver cedes active primary control in certain limited driving situations. The driver is still responsible for monitoring the roadway and safe operation and is expected to be available for control at all times and on short notice. The system can relinquish control with no advance warning and the driver must be ready to control the vehicle safely." 22 See infra note 77. 23 Cf. SAE J3016 at 4.4 (excluding "the selection of destinations and waypoints (i.e., navigation or route planning" from the "dynamic driving task"); Smith, supra note 21, at 4.4.4. 24 ISO/IEC 15288 at 5.1.2. 25 It does refer once to "adaptive cruise control" as an established term of art and, unfortunately, once to the "release [of] steering control." SAE J3016 at 10. 26 Id. at 2. 27 Id. at 6 (capitalization and spacing modified). 28 Preliminary Statement at 4-5. 29 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Ultimately, control is more useful as a structure than as a standalone term. Those who would deploy it should first describe the control system they actually intend: the goals, inputs, processes, and outputs to the extent they are determined by a human designer and the authority of the human or computer agents to the extent they are not.
Risk
The risk of a particular harm is the product of the probability of that harm and the severity of that harm; the risk of an act or omission is the sum of the risks of the particular associated harms. In the same way that a single lottery ticket might be extremely unlikely to produce a high payout and merely unlikely to produce a low payout, a single activity might have a low risk of death but a higher risk of nonfatal injury. This aggregate conception of risk is assumed much more than it is actually expressed. ISO 26262, for example, defines risk merely as the "combination of the occurrence of harm … and the severity of that harm." 30 The Restatement (Third) of Torts, for its part, describes "the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm" and "the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue." 31 Different domains are concerned about different harms. ISO 26262 confines harm to "physical injury or damage to the health of persons."
32 Tort law recognizes a broader class of harms, 33 albeit inconsistently, 34 and administrative rulemaking may identify even more harms. 35 Although corporate risk management may also encompass a wide range of harms, it focuses on financial and reputational risk to the company from the occurrence or allegation of injury.
This secondary risk to actors who may have created the primary risk must not be conflated with the primary risk itself. The two do belong to the same system of risk: Secondary risk can increase primary risk by discouraging desirable behavior or decrease it by discouraging undesirable behavior. Nonetheless, a given risk to life or limb cannot be "transferred" to another party or "reduced" by a grant of tort immunity.
Safety, Reasonableness, and Efficiency
Safety can be defined as protection from the risk of physical harm. Without more, however, the claim that a product is safe (or secure or privacy-protecting) is meaningless and, whether rhetorical, empirical, or absolute, tends to be refuted by the very occurrence of injury. Reasonableness typically provides the required qualification: ISO 26262 defines safety as the "absence of unreasonable risk," 36 There is a subtle difference between these two linguistic approaches: Although ISO 26262 attempts to infuse reasonableness into the term "safety," the Restatement implicitly invites readers to consider what is reasonable with every instance of the phrase "reasonably safe."
Engineering and law both struggle, however, to define reasonableness. ISO 26262 states that "unreasonable risk" is "risk judged to be unacceptable in a certain context according to valid societal moral concepts" but declines to specify what these concepts are or who should apply them. 38 Legal scholars have forced these questions but disagree on the answers. 39 Product liability, for example, has at least two arguably 40 competing tests for determining the existence of a design defect: one that explicitly uses costbenefit analysis and another that looks to the safety expectations of consumers.
41
Meaningful cost-benefit analysis requires an appropriate system. Excluding certain decisions could affect whether a behavior is deemed reasonable. For example, a car crash that seems unavoidable at the given speed might be avoidable at a lower speed. Or a product like lawn darts might seem to have the safest possible design when there may actually be no design that is reasonably safe. Moreover, choosing a particular goal could impact those outside the system. For example, trying to protect the occupants of a vehicle by increasing its mass could endanger pedestrians who are struck by it. If the objectively desirable outcome is not the "efficient" outcome, 42 then the model is wrong: Goals have been improperly defined, externalities have been incorrectly excluded, or elements have been inaccurately valued.
Responsibility
Responsibility can be used in a legal, technical, or moral sense. The suggestion in NHTSA's Preliminary Statement that the human driver is "solely responsible for safe operation" of vehicles in its first two levels of automation, 43 for example, is probably meant to describe the driver's technical role rather than to conclusively assign legal responsibility. SAE J3016, in contrast, avoids the potential conflation of these domains by speaking of performance rather than responsibility. 44 Even within the legal domain, responsibility requires careful definition. The concept encompasses both obligations and liabilities: A human driver, for example, is legally required to exercise due care, may be criminally liable if she drives recklessly (in some cases even if she causes no injury), and may be civilly liable if she causes injury (in some cases even if her conduct was reasonable). Similarly, an automaker is 37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998). 38 ISO 26262-1 at 1.129; see also id. at 1.93 (defining "reasonably foreseeable event" as an "event that is technically possible and has a credible or measurable rate of occurrence"). 39 legally required to certify that the vehicles it markets meet certain safety standards, 45 may be subject to civil fines if it does not comply with the certification requirements, 46 and may be subject to civil liability even if it does. 47 The legal question I am asked most frequently about vehicle automation concerns "who is responsible" in the event of a crash and is often accompanied by a binary choice: either the driver or the manufacturer. Liability, however, is not an either/or proposition: Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, the vehicle owner, operator, seller, manufacturer as well as upstream providers of parts and services may all be civilly and in some cases even criminally liable. The operator may have failed to properly monitor the vehicle (for which the owner may be also be liable), the manufacturer may have failed to properly guard against this misuse (for which the seller may also be liable), and other firms may have supplied defective components or incorrect data; any or all of these acts may have contributed to the injuries alleged.
This section began with control and ended with responsibility. The growing autonomy of robots will increase the need to articulate a principled relationship between these two concepts both within and across the technical, legal, and moral domains. One key to this relationship is the notion of use, 48 to which this chapter now turns.
Use
Engineered systems are used. This actual use (including misuse and abuse) may or may not be an intended use, a legal use, or even a reasonable use. An intended use is one for which the product is marketed (rather than just designed), a legal use is one that is not proscribed by law (even if it gives rise to civil liability), and a reasonable use is one with societal costs that do not exceed societal benefits (consistent with the discussion above). The Venn diagram below illustrates these four elements. 45 Tensions among the actual, intended, legal, and reasonable uses suggest particular structural failures. A mismatch between legal and reasonable use implies that law as written is either too permissive or too restrictive. A mismatch between reasonable and intended use suggests that the product is, for that use, categorically unsafe. A mismatch between intended and actual use suggests the possibility of a design or warning defect. A mismatch between intended and actual use suggests that users are either uninformed or irrational. A mismatch between actual and legal use suggests that law is either underenforced or obsolete. And a mismatch between legal and intended use suggests a "criminal product."
49 Texting-whiledriving restrictions illustrate several of these failures: Drivers who text while behind the wheel are behaving illegally and dangerously but not unusually, 50 and some bans on the practice may actually decrease road safety. 51 An open question is the extent to which product design should attempt to confine actual uses to those that are legal, reasonable, or intended. 56 Indeed, the notion of X-by-design-where X is safety, security, privacy, sustainability, or some other value-suggests that products must be designed for their entire lifecycle. While technical and contractual limitations on use might improve product safety, they may also calcify existing law, invite tampering, and preclude some uses that are reasonable and legal.
Traffic speed provides a more extended illustration of the complex interactions among and within these four elements. Imagine that you are driving your car at 70 miles per hour; are you speeding? Answering this question is easy-so easy that it has numerous answers.
57 Consider a few, divided crudely among legal speed, actual speed, reasonable speed, and design speed:
Legal Speed
Speed restrictions have multiple sources within law: 58  Statutory speeds. Many state vehicle codes specify maximum speeds for certain road classes, such as Interstate highways, rural two-lane roads, and urban streets.
 Posted regulatory speed. A road's posted speed may be lower than its statutory speed. The state or local maintaining authority typically sets such a limit by reference to the road's operating speed.
 Posted advisory speed. On some road segments, the maintaining authority may advise a speed that is lower than that which is posted. Enforcement of such an advisory speed is at most indirect, through the basic speed law.
 Basic speed. The "basic speed law" common to most states requires drivers to maintain a reasonable and prudent speed. If visibility is poor, for example, driving slower than the posted speed might nonetheless violate this requirement. speed limit in 1974 primarily to reduce energy consumption and retained it in some form for over 20 years in large part because of the perceived (crash) safety benefits. 68 Safety itself can be defined expansively or narrowly. Emissions from motor vehicles directly harm human health: One study estimated that these emissions annually kill roughly 58,000 people in the United States alone. 69 Typically, however, motor vehicle safety contemplates "only" crashes, which each year kill more than 30,000 and injure more than 2,000,000 in the United States. 70 Vehicle speed can increase both the probability and severity of a crash. A pedestrian, for example, is highly unlikely to die if struck by a car traveling at 20 mph and highly likely to die if struck by a car traveling at twice that speed; every 1 percent change in speed is associated with an increase of about 4 percent in fatal crashes. 71 Crash probability and severity, however, can also depend on vehicle design. Ralph Nader's seminal book on the automotive industry of the mid-20th Century sought in part to rebut the broad perception that high-speed vehicle crashes were simply unsurvivable. 72 Since then, improvements to active and passive safety systems in vehicles have contributed to a significant decline in crash-related fatalities. 73 Risk tolerance has also decreased over that period. NHTSA estimated the value of a life at $1 million in 1973, $4 million in 2005, and $6 million in 2010 (adjusted for inflation). 74 This persistent rise suggests that people were undervalued either by the federal government or by the people themselves-and that this might continue to be the case today.
Design Speed
Transportation engineers frequently use a particular "design speed" to determine minimum geometric requirements for a road, including how sharply it can turn and how far along it a driver must be able to see. Only recently have state transportation authorities begun to separate design speed from the concept of safe speed. 75 Inherent in the design speed, which often exceeds the posted speed (whether regulatory or advisory), are myriad assumptions about environmental conditions and vehicle capabilities: A truck on wet pavement will handle differently than a sports car on dry pavement, for example. Furthermore, design speed has, at least prior to modern traffic calming approaches, functioned as a floor but not a ceiling: A horizontal curve might be widened or banked to accommodate travel at the design speed, but extraneous curves would not be introduced solely to discourage higher speeds. As one state department of transportation noted, this could yield "an infinite Design Speed" on a straight and flat road.
76 Such a speed would be difficult to exceed. *** In short, legal speed affects design speed, which affects reasonable speed, which affects actual speed, which affects legal speed, which affects actual speed, which affects reasonable speed. These three concepts are distinct and dynamic, and designing a road that satisfies all of them without distorting any of them may well be impossible. Automated systems face a similar dilemma, in part because they still depend in part on human judgment or performance. The next section develops this point.
Users
In the words of the Defense Science Board (DSB), "all autonomous systems are joint human-machine cognitive systems." 77 They "are supervised by humans to some degree, and the best capabilities result from the coordination and collaboration of humans and machines." 78 In a sense, the DSB implicitly argues that automated systems should be conceived broadly enough that humans who might otherwise be viewed as external designers or users are instead viewed as internal operators or supervisors.
79 This is a wise approach.
ISO 26262 illustrates the interplay between human and machine in today's safety-relevant electric and electronic systems. Some of the active safety technologies that fall within its scope, such as antilock brakes and electronic stability control, are designed to compensate for the shortcomings of the human driver. Conversely, the required integrity level of these technologies depends in part on the driver's ability to detect failure and on her ability to avoid the specific harm caused by that failure. 80 In this way, both the safety technology and the human driver are part of a larger safety system.
